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RE-EVALUATING GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA IN LIGHT OF
TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
BY JOHN M. LEWIS 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situation: John and Jane meet, fall in love,
marry, and have a daughter that they name Donna. John is a para-
trooper stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He and his family live
in rural Cumberland County on a three-acre portion of his parents'
farm. John is an only child, and Donna is his parents' only grandchild.
As is often the case, the relationship between Jane and John's mother is
rather strained. Jane feels that John's mother is too intrusive, and
John's mother does not think that Jane is "good enough" for her "baby
boy." Suddenly an international crisis arises, and John is sent into
harms way. Tragically, John is killed in the defense of our country's
national interests. Jane grieves and remains at the marital home for a
year, but when Donna is three years old, Jane decides to move closer to
her parents in western North Carolina. As the months pass, Jane, for
whatever reason, no longer allows John's parents to have any commu-
nication or contact with their only grandchild. As a last resort, John's
parents visit a lawyer to find out what options, if any, they may have in
regard to obtaining visitation with their granddaughter.
Although the facts of this hypothetical situation may appear unu-
sual, situations involving the denial of grandparental visitation in
cases in which where one parent is deceased, have become increas-
ingly common.2 Current North Carolina law does not grant legal
standing to biological grandparents except in limited circumstances.
3
Under the facts in the above-described hypothetical, the grandparents
lack legal standing to petition for court ordered visitation. In an effort
1. The author is an Associate Attorney with the Law Firm of J. Richardson
Rudisill, Jr., in Hickory, North Carolina. The Firm's practice primarily focuses upon
complex domestic litigation. B.A., 1995, The Citadel; J.D., 1998, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
2. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Shaut v. Cannon, 136
N.C.App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C.App.
435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000); Ennis v. Fish, (No. COA99-1382) (unpublished).
3. See infra notes 127-139 and accompanying text.
249
1
Lewis: Re-Evaluating Grandparental Visitation in North Carolina in Light
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
to interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a)4 in a manner that comports
with the constitutional rights of natural parents,5 the North Carolina
appellate courts have reached conclusions such as this by ignoring
what appears to be a broad grant of legal standing contained within
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), and by violating various long standing
tenets of statutory construction.6 In light of the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. Granville,7 this conclusion
reached by the North Carolina appellate courts" is no longer neces-
sary, and may fail to adequately protect the constitutional rights of
natural parents .9 As such, the North Carolina appellate courts should
reverse their prior decisions and adopt a new approach to this emo-
tionally charged and constitutionally hazardous area.' 0
II. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE
In the years since the recognition of substantive due process
rights, the United States Supreme Court has examined the nature of a
parent's "protected status" concerning the "care, custody, control and
supervision" of their minor children." In January 2000, the Supreme
Court, for the first time, directly addressed the constitutionality of a
statute which grants standing to grandparents to petition for court
ordered visitation with their minor grandchildren.' 2 In Troxel v. Gran-
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1 reads:
Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institution
claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or
proceeding for the custody of such child, as hereinafter provided. Unless a
contrary intent is clear, the word 'custody' shall be deemed to include
custody or visitation or both.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a)
5. See In Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981):
This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple
citation that a parent's desire for and right to "the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children" is an important interest that
"undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."
Id. at 26 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 51(1972)).
6. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
7. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
8. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 5. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
12. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
250 [Vol. 23:249
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ville,' 3 an appeal from the Supreme Court of Washington, 14 the
Supreme Court examined a visitation statute15 which grants broad
standing to grandparents 16 to petition for court ordered visitation with
their minor grandchildren. Jenifer and Gary Troxel (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the Troxels") initiated an action for visita-
tion with their minor granddaughters, Natalie and Isabelle Troxel,
against Tommie Granville, the natural mother of the minor children.'
7
The two children were born out of a non-marital relationship between
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel."8 After Brad Troxel and Tommie
Granville separated, Brad Troxel moved in with his parents and fre-
quently brought his daughters home to visit with them.' 9 Tragically, in
May 1993, Brad Troxel committed suicide. 20 After the death of their
son, the Troxels continued to visit with their granddaughters until
October 1993, when Tommie Granville expressed a desire to limit the
Troxels' visitation to one short period per month.21 The Troxels
rejected this proposal and were thereafter not allowed to visit with their
granddaughters until April 1994, when a temporary order of visitation
was entered.22 During the trial, the Troxels requested that they be
granted two weekend visits per month and two weeks during the sum-
mer.23 Tommie Granville, relying on the advice of an attorney,
13. Id.
14. See In re the Custody of Smith v. Stillwell and Troxel v. Granville, 969 P.2d 21
(1998). The Supreme Court of Washington consolidated two appeals, both of which
involved issues of third party visitation. In re the Custody of Smith v. Stillwell involved
an action for visitation by a "former companion" non-parent against a natural parent.
Since the United States Supreme Court and this article only address the issue of
grandparents' rights, a discussion of the facts and result of this particular case is not
relevant.
15. Wash. Rev. Code § 26310.160(3) (1999) provides: "Any person may petition
the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may
serve the best interests of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances."
16. Id. The challenged Washington statute grants standing to "any individuals"
who claim a right to custody, and not merely the grandparents of the minor children.
Id.
17. Troxel v. Granville, 940 P.2d 698, 698-99 (1997); review granted, 950 P.2d 478
(1998); affd in part, rev'd in part, 969 P.2d 21 (1998); cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1067
(1999); affd, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
2001]
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requested that the court order only one day of visitation per month
with no overnight stay. 24 The trial court granted the Troxels one week-
end visitation per month, one week during the summer, and four
hours on each of the minor children's birthdays.2 5 Tommie Granville
appealed the trial court's order, challenging the Troxels' standing to
bring an action for visitation.
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, conducted a de
novo review of the challenged statute. 26 The court attempted to iden-
tify a consistent legislative intent, allowing the statute to be read in pari
materia,2 7 and where the language of the statute was given, the court
attempted to give the statutory language its ordinary and plain mean-
ing.2 The court examined the history of the third party custody act 29
and traced the evolution of that act through various stages of legislative
amendment.30 This analysis led the court to conclude that the legisla-
ture "unintentionally" failed to amend the provision of the Act that
purportedly allowed the Troxels to initiate an action for visitation.3' In
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. At this juncture, it is significant to note that both the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court have conducted de novo reviews of the
legislative intent behind the statutory scheme created by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.1-
13.5 (2000).
27. Literally meaning "upon the same subject", this rule of statutory construction
involves the interpretation of various legislative enactments, some general and some
specific in a manner so as to reveal a consistent legislative intent. Black's Law
Dictionary 791 (6 th ed. 1990). See also McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461
S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995) ("Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general
and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a
more minute and definite way, the two shall be read together and harmonized, if
possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy .... ") (quoting
National Food Stores v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-
29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)).
28. Troxel v. Granville, 940 P.2d 698, 699-701 (1997). In Troxel, the court stated:
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. The
primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the
Legislature by examining the language of the statute. We give words their
plain meaning unless a contrary intent appears. We also must construe
statutes "as a whole in order to ascertain legislative purpose, and thus avoid
unlikely, strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal
reading."
Id. (quoting Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 382 P.2d 639 (1963)).
29. The specific act within the Revised Code of Washington that relates to child
custody and child support is entitled the "Nonparental Actions for Child Custody."
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.010 et seq. (1999).
30. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 700-01.
31. Id. at 700-01. The court concluded:
[Vol. 23:249252
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the end, the court, having divined the intent of the legislature, con-
cluded that the Troxels could only initiate an action for visitation "con-
temporaneously with a proceeding for child custody."32
The Supreme Court of Washington granted the Troxels' petition
for review, 33 and like the court of appeals before it, conducted a de
novo review as to the meaning of the statutory language.34 Once again,
the history of the various legislative enactments and amendments were
examined in great detail;35 however, the supreme court found that the
court of appeals disregarded the "plain and unambiguous" language of
the statute, and disagreed with the conclusion of the court of
appeals.36 As a result, the court held that the Troxels possessed the
statutory standing to initiate an independent action for visitation.
37
Although this statutory interpretation was momentarily beneficial to
the Troxels' position, the supreme court proceeded to examine this
interpretation in light of substantive due process protections afforded
to natural parents.38  In an opinion similar to the North Carolina
Therefore, we must assume that the Legislature's failure to similarly amend
the later statute was the result of an unintentional oversight .... For all the
reasons discussed above, whether or not the Legislature overlooked
amending RCW 26.10.160(3) when it amended RCW 26.09.240, we believe
it did intend that a custody preceding be in effect before third parties could
petition for visitation.
Id.
32. See Troxel v. Granville, 954 P.2d 289 (1998) captioned "Order Changing
Opinion" which amended 940 P.2d 698, at 701 (1998); cf. infra notes 127-137 and
accompanying text.
33. 950 P.2d 478 (1998).
34. In re Custody of Smith v. Stillwell and Troxel v. Granville, 969 P.2d 21, 24-25
(1998).
35. Id. at 24-26
36. The supreme court began its review of the opinion of the court of appeals by
noting that "[tihis court has emphasized that it will not construe unambiguous
language and that 'it assume[s] that the legislature means exactly what it says."' Id. at
25. The supreme court "decline[d] to construe the language of RCW 26.10.160(3)
because [they found] that the language of the statute [was] unambiguous." Id. at 26.
The Washington Supreme Court's failure to "modify" the language of the statute, or
apply judicially created limitations on its applicability, will prove to be key in the
analysis of the United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying
text.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 27-31. Since the Washington Court of Appeals resolved the standing
issue by determining that the statute did not grant standing to the Troxels, the
Washington Supreme Court did not directly address the constitutional implications of
such a broad statute.
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Supreme Court opinion in Petersen v. Rogers,39 the Washington
Supreme Court held that the state's power as parens patriae40 could
not justify government intrusion into a natural parent's decision con-
41hecerning with whom their minor children associate. In further
defense of their conclusion, the supreme court noted that the statute,
by its own terms, failed to provide any "safeguards" for a parent's pro-
tected status. The court also found the statute did not provide gui-
dance to the trial courts as to what factors to consider, and what
weight, if any, should be given to those factors.42
In September 1999, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to review the opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington.43
In a 6-3 decision,44 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
39. 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994). See infra notes 118-125 and
accompanying text. In the respective analyses of the constitutionally protected right of
a natural parent to the care, custody and control of their minor children, the North
Carolina Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court cite to United States
Supreme Court opinions of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). One
striking dissimilarity between the two opinions is the failure on the part of the North
Carolina Supreme Court to identify and use the applicable standard of review to
governmental actions which infringe upon a "fundamental right." In Troxel, the
Washington Supreme Court conducted its constitutional analysis by applying the
strict scrutiny standard of review, which requires the state to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest coupled with a narrowly tailored means. 969 P.2d
at 28. See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); City of
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). The North Carolina Supreme Court
appears to have identified certain specific factual circumstances which would warrant
governmental intervention and invented a bright-line test. The fact that the United
States Supreme Court did not conduct its own "strict scrutiny" review nor even
mention "strict scrutiny" suggests that a parent's "protected status" does not rise to the
level of a "fundamental right" under substantive due process.
40. "'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role
of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles
or the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state
to protect the interests of the child." Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990)
(citations omitted).
41. Troxel, 969 P.2d at 30. The Washington Supreme Court interpreted United
Supreme Court precedent to require proof of harm to the minor child in order for the
state to interfere with the parent's "protected status." Id. at 29. Cf. infra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 30-31. The fact that the Washington statutory scheme lacked safeguards
or guidance for the trial court, whether contained within the language of the statute or
mandated by judicial review, became important in the United States Supreme Court's
review of the statute. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
43. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S.1069 (1999).
44. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The plurality opinion of the Court was
authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
6
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Supreme Court of Washington. Before conducting a constitutional
analysis of the Washington statute, the plurality opinion recognized
the increasing trend among the various states to enact statutes that
recognize the ever-increasing importance of the extended, non-nuclear
family, particularly grandparents.45 The United States Supreme
Court's constitutional analysis began, as the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington's opinion began, by recognizing that parents have a protected
right46 to the care, custody, and control of their minor children. 47
After comparing the Washington statute as interpreted in light of this
protected right, the Court concluded that the statute was "breathtak-
ingly broad", and therefore unconstitutional as applied in this case.48
The plurality opinion concluded that the statute was overly broad
in that it granted "any person" standing to petition for visitation and
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justices Souter and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but
filed separate concurring opinions. Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy dissented
from the judgment of the Court and filed separate dissenting opinions. Although not
germane to the subject of this article, arguably the most intriguing aspect of this
particular case is the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, who announced his
willingness to overturn all prior Supreme Court decisions which recognize so-called
substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 78-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, in
his dissent, wrote:
I write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive
due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original understanding
of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights under that constitutional provision. As a result, I express no view on
the merits of this matter, and I understand the plurality as well to leave the
resolution of that issue for another day.
Id.
45. See id. at 64. The Court stated:
The nationwide enactment of non-parental visitation statutes is assuredly
due, in some part, to the State's recognition of these changing realities of the
American family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties
of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the
welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children
form with such third parties.
Id. See also id. at 74 n.1 (plurality opinion) (listing third party visitation statutes from
all fifty states).
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. As mentioned above, it remains
unclear as to the full nature of a parent's "protected status." The Washington Supreme
Court treated this "protected status" as involving a "fundamental" substantive due
process right and applied strict scrutiny review. The United States Supreme Court
refers to the "protected status" as involving a "fundamental" liberty interest; however,
the Court does not apply, nor refer to "strict scrutiny" review.
47. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64.
48. Id. at 67.
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did not provide any indication as to what weight, if any, should be
given to the decision of the natural parent.4 9 The plurality found that
the practical result of the over-reaching nature of the Washington stat-
ute is that whenever a person claiming right to visitation is denied
visitation by the minor children's parents, that person may seek judi-
cial review of that decision. 50 The plurality concluded that absent stat-
utorily or judicially imposed safeguards protecting the "protected
status" of a natural parent, the statute impermissibly infringed upon
that status.51
Although the plurality opinion could have ended its inquiry by
simply announcing that a natural parent enjoys a "protected status"
concerning the care, custody, control and supervision of their minor
children, it continued by identifying factors which are relevant to a
judicial inquiry into whether to grant visitation with a third party over
the objections of the natural parents. 5 2 The plurality opinion identi-
fied three such factors. The first factor involves allegations, by the per-
son petitioning for visitation of parental unfitness.53 Despite the fact
that there is a presumption that a fit parent will act so as to further the
best interests of his or her minor child,54 the plurality opinion did not
definitively hold that parental unfitness is the one pivotal factor in
determining whether or not a state may permissibly override a paren-
49. Id. at 67.
50. Id. ("Thus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard
and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a
third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the
judge's determination of the child's best interests.").
51. The Supreme Court noted that the Supreme Court of Washington had the
opportunity to judicially restrict the applicability of the challenged statute, but chose
to refrain from so doing. Id.
52. Id. at 67-71.
53. Id. at 68.
54. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979):
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.
Id. at 602. See also Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997)
(citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, (1983)).
[Vol. 23:249256
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tal decision. 5 According to the plurality opinion, allegations of unfit-
ness are but one factor to be considered.
56
A second factor identified by the plurality opinion is the weight to
be given to the determination by the natural parent to deny visita-
tion.57 Due to the presumption that a natural parent will act in the
best interests of his or her minor child '1 a trial court must give special
weight to the decision of the natural parent.5 9 The plurality found that
the trial court's decision in Troxel was problematic because it reversed
this presumption and required the natural parent to demonstrate that
the requested visitation would "adversely affect" the minor
child(ren). 60 By reversing this presumption, the trial court failed to
provide the requisite special weight to the decision of the natural par-
ent.61 As with allegations of unfitness, the decision by the natural par-
ent not to allow visitation was found instructive, but not determinative:
Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the
decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be ben-
eficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first
instance. And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some
special weight to the parent's own determination.62
The third factor which the Court identified as significant in deter-
mining whether to override the decision of a natural parent is whether
55. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69. The Court stated:
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's child.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Price v. Howard, 346 NC. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997);
Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
56. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 ("To be sure, this case involves a visitation petition filed
by grandparents soon after the death of their son-the father of Isabelle and Natalie-
but the combination of several factors here compel our conclusion that § 26.10.160(3),
as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 69-70.
58. See supra note 54.
59. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
60. In essence, the reversal of the presumption by the trial court forced Granville to
prove that visitation with the grandparents was not in the best interests of the minor
child. Id. at 69.
61. See id. at 69-70 ("In that respect, the trial court's presumption failed to provide
any protection for Granville's fundamental constitutional right to make decisions
concerning the rearing of her own daughters.").
62. Id. at 70. This statement presupposes the fact that a third party, namely a
grandparent, can maintain an action for visitation despite the decision of the natural
parent to deny such visitation.
20011 257
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that parent has denied complete contact between the third party and
the minor child(ren).6 3 In Troxel, Granville did not seek to terminate
all contact between the minor children and her paternal grandpar-
ents.64 To the contrary, Granville only sought to reduce the amount of
contact. In support of the relevancy of this factor, the plurality opinion
cited, apparently with approval, several state statutes that grant grand-
parents standing to petition for visitation when the natural parents
have denied complete contact.6 5 Specifically, the plurality opinion
cited Mississippi,6 6 Oregon,67 and Rhode Island 68 statutes, all of which
63. Id. at 71 ("Finally, we note that there is not allegation that Granville ever
sought to cut off visitation entirely.")
64. Id. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65. Although the opinion does not definitively hold that these statutes comport
with constitutional mandates, it would be illogical for the Justices to cite these statutes
in support of their analysis if the author and the supporting Justices did not perceive
these statutes constitutional. See 530 U.S. at 71-72.
66. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Any grandparent who is not authorized to petition for visitation rights
pursuant to subsection (1) of this section may petition the chancery court
and seek visitation rights with his or her grandchild, and the court may grant
visitation tights to the grandparent, provided the court finds:
(a) That the grandparent of the child had established a viable relationship
with the child and the parent or custodian of the child unreasonably denied
the grandparent visitation rights with the child; and
(b) That visitation rights of the grandparent with the child would be in the
best interests of the child.
67. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.121 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
(1)(a) A child's grandparent may, upon petition to the circuit court, be
granted an order establishing reasonable rights of visitation between the
grandparent and the child if:
(A) The grandparent has established or has attempted to establish ongoing
personal contact with the minor child; and
(B) The custodian of the minor child has denied the grandparent reasonable
opportunity to visit the child.
68. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-24.3 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The family court upon miscellaneous petition of a grandparent for
visitation rights with the petitioner's grandchild and upon notice to both
parents of the child and notice to the child, and after hearing thereon, may
grant reasonable rights of visitation of the grandchild to the petitioner.
(2) The court, in order to grant petitioner reasonable rights of visitation,
must find and set forth in writing the following findings of fact:
(i) That it is in the best interest of the grandchild that petitioner be granted
visitation rights with the grandchild;
(ii) That the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation rights with
the grandchild;
(iii) That the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit his or her
grandchild during the ninety (90) days immediately preceding the date the
258
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provide for grandparental visitation when the natural parent(s) com-
pletely denies contact between the grandparent and the minor
children.
Although presented with the opportunity to define the exact scope
of third parties' rights to court ordered visitation contrary to the
wishes of the children's natural parents, the Court was unwilling to do
so. 69 Instead, the Court chose to limit its examination to the sweeping
breadth of the Washington statute. In addition, instead of outlining a
"bright-line" test in determining when a third party visitation statute
adequately safe-guarded the protected status of a natural parent, the
plurality opinion suggests that this is a judgment best left to a case-by-
case determination, guided by the factors outlined by the opinion.70
In the end, it was the combination of the three factors, or the lack
thereof, that led the plurality opinion to the conclusion that the Wash-
ington statute was unconstitutional.7 1
petition was filed and was not allowed to visit the grandchild during the
ninety (90) day period as a direct result of the actions of either, or both
parents of the grandchild;
(iv) That there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or her
grandchild without court intervention; and
(v) That petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has successfully
rebutted the presumption that the parent's decision to refuse the grandparent
visitation with the grandchild was reasonable.
69. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. The Court stated:
Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of § 26.10.160(3) and
the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not
consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington
Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-parental
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the
child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.
Id. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States does not sit to announce 'unique' dispositions. Its
principle function is to establish precedent-that is, to set forth principles of law that
every court in America must follow.").
70. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. The Court stated:
[W]e agree withJustice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for
awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is
applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best
'elaborated with care.' Because much state-court adjudication in this context
occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific
non-parental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se
matter.
Id. (quoting language from Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in the same case)
(citations omitted).
71. Id. at 72 ("Considered together with the Superior Court's reason's for awarding
visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these factors demonstrates that the
11
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Although instructive, the Troxel plurality opinion falls far short of
providing clear guidance to state appellate courts as to the way in
which they must determine constitutional challenges to their respec-
tive non-parental visitation statutes.72 Are the three factors examined
by the plurality opinion the only factors lower courts must or may con-
sider? What weight should be given to each factor? What is the bur-
den of proof required of the petitioning non-parent? These are all valid
questions which remain unanswered. Despite the unanswered ques-
tions, the greatest impact of the Troxel decision is that the United
States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that it is constitution-
ally feasible for a grandparent to obtain visitation rights despite the
protestations of the minor children's natural parents.73
Compounding the lack of clarity in the plurality opinion is the
fact that it is simply a plurality opinion, not a majority opinion, and,
therefore, is of little or no benefit as precedent. Despite these various
short-comings, when the plurality opinion is read in conjunction with
the dissents of Justices Stevens and Scalia, one can see that it is possi-
ble for a state to enact legislation granting grandparents standing to
petition for visitation, which will possibly command a 6-3 majority."4
The dissent of Justice Stevens clearly argues that a parent's "protected
status" as a parent is not absolute,75 and that the constitution does not
require a showing of "harm" in order for the state to infringe upon that
visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of her
two daughters.").
72. The plurality opinion also fails to provide clear guidance to state legislatures as
to how to draft third party visitation statutes, which adequately protect parents'
constitutionally "protected status." The opinion did note, in a footnote, that all fifty
states have some type of non-parental visitation statute. See id. at 74 n.1 (plurality
opinion).
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. The Justice Kennedy's dissent primarily focused upon the issue of whether a
demonstration of "harm" is required in order to grant visitation to a third party, over
the objections of the minor child's parents. Justice Kennedy, recognizing that all fifty
states have statutes that grant third-party visitation, would not require proof of harm
in order to grant visitation to third parties. Justice Kennedy also noted the importance
of providing protection to natural parents in the form of restrictions on who can
petition for visitation, and in the form of preferences in favor of a parent's decision.
Although this dissent does not explicitly agree with the plurality opinion, it recognizes
that a parent's protected status is not absolute, and can be overridden based upon
factors that do not rise to the level of "harm" to the minor child.
75. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional protection
against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended to
prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental
authority that is not motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child.").
12
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status.76 Justice Stevens' dissent goes as far to suggest that the courts
should balance the constitutional rights of minor children in addition
to the rights of parents.77 Justice Scalia would limit the recognition of
a parent's "protected status",'7  and would not recognize the ability of
the federal courts to overrule the will of the people as expressed
through laws duly enacted by their representative legislatures. 79 Based
upon the plurality opinion and the dissents of Justices Stevens and
Scalia, it seems possible for state legislatures to enact logical grandpa-
rental visitation statutes which adequately protect the rights of natural
parents, but which are not restrictive to the point that the statute
becomes a legal nullity.8 0
76. Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The second key aspect of the Washington
Supreme Court's holding-that the Federal Constitution requires a showing of actual
or potential "harm" to the child before a court may order visitation continued over a
parent's objections-finds no support in this Court's case law.").
77. Id. at 88.
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's
liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, it
seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so,
too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be
balanced in the equation.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 92.
A legal principle [the parent's protected status] that can be thought to
produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is
not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I would not
now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I
extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf. supra note 44 (concerning Justice Thomas's willingness
to overrule prior decisions establishing substantive due process rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution).
79. Troxel, 530 US. at 91-91.
[Wihile I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to
representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in
legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to
interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not
believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge
entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what
is (in my view) that unenumerated right [parent's protected status].
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. If one considers the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, who would
eliminate substantive due process rights all together, a properly drafted, or properly
interpreted statute, could possibly command a 6-3 majority opinion.
13
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III. CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA LAW
Like the State of Washington, North Carolina has enacted a stat-
ute that grants broad standing to individuals to initiate actions for cus-
tody and/or visitation with minor children.8 In addition to one broad
statute, North Carolina has enacted several other statutes that govern
certain limited circumstances.8 2 In light of indications that the broad
statute may fail to adequately safeguard the "protected status" of natu-
ral parents,83 the North Carolina appellate courts have attempted to
limit its scope.8 4 Despite these attempts to interpret the North Caro-
lina statute constitutionally, the various opinions in the Troxel case
demonstrate its continued invalidity.85
In order to fully understand the present illogical status of North
Carolina law regarding the issue of grandparental visitation, one must
begin by examining the various legislative enactments8 6 and conclude
by examining the relevant appellate court decisions.87 Within Chapter
50 of the North Carolina General Statutes, 88 four sections, either
directly or indirectly, address the issue of grandparental visitation:
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.1(a), 9 50-13.2(bl),9 ° 50-13.2A,91 50-
81. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) (2000). See also supra note 4.
82. See infra notes 93-95.
83. "We note that this subject may involve constitutional issues relating to the
substantive due process interests in the care and custody of one's children. As neither
party has brought the issue before this Court, we do not address it." Ray v. Ray, 103
N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592, 593-94 (1991), overruled by Petersen v. Rogers, 337
N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994). In addition to the general statute being
unconstitutional absent judicial interpretation, the other "special" statutes designed to
apply to limited circumstances are, more likely than not, unconstitutional as well. See
infra note 198 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 115-164 and accompanying text. Cf. supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text (the State of Washington, which refused to interpret their general
statute); notes 49-51 and accompanying text (Supreme Court opinion in Troxel
focused upon protecting decisions of the natural parent).
85. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 92-95.
87. See infra notes 105-172 and accompanying text.
88. Chapter 50 of the North Carolina General Statutes contains legislative
enactments concerning issues of domestic relations (e.g., absolute divorce, divorce
from bed and, board, alimony, post separation support, child custody and child
support).
89. See supra note 4.
90. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) reads:
An order for custody of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any
grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As
used in this subsection, 'grandparent' includes biological grandparents of a
[Vol. 23:249
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13.5(j). 9 2 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) is the broad statute intended to
eliminate previously conflicting statutes addressing issues of child cus-
tody.9 3 Although the language of the statute is considerably broad, 94
its application has been greatly limited through judicial interpreta-
tion.95 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) enables a trial judge, exercising
child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial
relationship exists between the grandparent and the child.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) (2000).
91. "A biological grandparent may institute an action or proceeding for visitation
rights with a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial
relationship exists between the grandparent and the child." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A
(2000).
92. "In any action in which custody of a minor child has been determined, upon a
motion in the cause and showing of changed circumstances pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7,
the grandparents of the child are entitled to such custody or visitation rights as the
court, in its discretion, deems appropriate." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j) (2000).
93. See In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 111, 160 S.E.2d 90 (1968) ("By the enactment
of this Chapter the Legislature has sought to eliminate the conflicting and inconsistent
statutes, which have caused pitfalls for litigants, and to bring all of the statutes relating
to child custody and support together into one act.").
94. See Oxendine v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 303 N.C. 699, 706, 281 S.E.2d 370, 374
(1981):
Had the Legislature intended G.S. 50-13.1 to apply to only those custody
disputes involved in a divorce or separation, it would have expressly so
provided, as it did in the prior statutes G.S. 50-13 and G.S. 50-16. The mere
fact that G.S. 50-13.1 is found in the Chapter of the General Statutes
governing Divorce and Alimony is not sufficient to cause its application to be
restricted to custody disputes involved in separation or divorce.
Id.
95. See infra notes 105 - 172 and accompanying text. See also McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 635, 461 S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (1995) ("The three special
statutes provide grandparents with the right to seek 'visitation' only in certain clearly
specified situations. Those situations do not include that of initiating suit against
parents whose family is intact and where no custody proceeding is ongoing. A
legislative intent contrary to that for which plaintiffs argue therefore seems clear.");
Peterson v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901, 906 (1994). The court in Peterson
reasoned:
We agree with the reasoning of the trial court in Ray that N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1
was not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring custody or
visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such strangers.
Such a right would conflict with the constitutionally-protected paramount
right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children.
Peterson, 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906. Cf. Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 793,
407 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1991), overruled by Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d
901 (1994). In Ray, the court stated:
We agree that in Moore and Acker the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated
that parents have such a prerogative to determine with whom their children
associate. However, we hold that in 1989 when the legislature changed
15
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his or her discretion, to grant specific visitation to the minor child's
grandparents96 when entering an order of child custody in an ongoing
custody action. 97 When a minor child has been adopted, and the
minor child's grandparents9' can demonstrate a "substantial relation-
ship" with the minor child, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A grants grand-
parents standing to petition for visitation. 99 Once the custody of a
minor child has been determined, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j) enables
the minor child's grandparents' 00 to file a Motion in the Cause and
petition for visitation.' 0 ' A cursory examination of these statutes
would lead one to the conclusion that grandparents have several proce-
dural options when petitioning for visitation with their minor
grandchildren. Unfortunately, this cursory examination of the mean-
ing and application of these statutes is far from accurate.
Since the adoption of these legislative provisions, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals have
examined, interpreted, re-examined and re-interpreted the "meaning"
of these statutes. In particular, the courts have focused upon interpret-
ing the broad statute in accord with the three specific statutes in an
effort to identify a consistent legislative intent. 10 2 When N.C. Gen.
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1(a) so that it includes the right to bring an action for
visitation, that law changed.
Ray, 103 N.C. App. at 793, 407 S.E.2d at 593.
96. Not all grandparents are allowed to petition for visitation pursuant to this
statute. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) for the definition of the class
"grandparent."
97. See Moore v. Moore, 89 N.C.App. 351, 365 S.E.2d 662, at 663 (1988) ("While
this provision authorizes the court to provide for the visitation rights to grandparents
when the custody of minor children is being litigated, it does not authorize the court to
enter such an order when the custody of the children is not even in issue."). See also
Fisher v. Gaydon, 124 N.C.App. 442, 445-46, 477 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1996).
98. As with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl), not all grandparents are included within
the statutory class "grandparents." See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A (2000).
99. See generally Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14 (1988).
100. The class of persons known as "grandparents" for the purposes of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.5(j) is limited in the same fashion as for N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.50); supra note 99.
101. In order to exercise the rights granted by this statute, petitioning grandparents
must demonstrate "changed circumstances" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7.
102. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995), in
which the court stated:
"Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and
comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in
a more minute and definite way, the two shall be read together and
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative
policy . .. ."
[Vol. 23:249
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Stat. § 50-13.1(a) was amended in 1989 by the inclusion of a second
sentence,'1 3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Ray v. Ray 10 4 held
that the amendment permitted grandparents to initiate a separate,
independent action for visitation. In so concluding, the court of
appeals determined that the specific statutes were "merely supplemen-
tal" to the general provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a).10'
Although the decision in Ray would appear to determine the issue of
"consistent legislative intent," the final paragraph of the court's opin-
ion questioned the constitutional validity of the statute as
interpreted.' 06
The causes behind the need for the examination and re-examina-
tion of the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) are multi-faceted.
As noted above, the courts must read various legislative enactments,
addressing the same issue, in pari materia.10 7 In addition to this
requirement, however, is a presumption that legislative enactments
comport with constitutional mandates,' 0 and a requirement that the
courts interpret statutes, if possible, so as to comport with these man-
dates.' 0 9 These three tenets of statutory construction are then coupled
Id.(quoting Nat'l Food Stores v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C.
624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)).
103. "Unless a contrary intent is clear, the word 'custody' shall be deemed to include
custody or visitation or both." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) (2000).
104. 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991), overruled by Petersen v. Rogers,
337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
105. Ray, 103 N.C. App. at 793, 407 S.E.2d at 593 (1991). The court stated:
[W]e hold that in 1989 when the legislature changed N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1(a)
so that it includes the right to bring an action for visitation, that law
changed .... Other statutes which allow for visitation (i.e., N.C.G.S. §§ 50-
13.2A, 50-13.2(bl), and 50-13.5(j)) are merely supplemental. These statutes
do not in any way contradict N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1(a) nor do they create an
exception to the step-grandparent's right to bring an action for visitation in
this case.
Id.
106. The court stated: "We note that this subject may involve constitutional issues
relating to the substantive due process interests in the care and custody of one's
children. As neither party has brought the issue before this Court, we do not address
it." Id. at 793, 407 S.E.2d at 593-94.
107. See supra note 26.
108. See Ramsey v. Veterans Comm'n, 261 N.C. 645, 647, 135 S.E.2d 659, 661
(1964) ("The presumption is that any act passed by the legislature is constitutional,
and the court will not strike it down if such legislation can be upheld on any
reasonable ground.").
109. See In re Dairy Farms, 289 N.C. 456, 465-66, 223 S.E.2d 323, 328-29 (1976)
("If a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which will raise a
serious question as to its constitutionality and the other will avoid such question, it is
2652001]
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with the mandate that the language of the statute be given its usual and
ordinary meaning, l I ° and that all irreconcilable conflicts be decided in
favor of the most recently enacted statute.1"' The desired result of the
process of statutory interpretation is to arrive at a constitutional and
logical statutory scheme that reflects the intentions of the elected
legislature.
In 1994, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Petersen v. Rog-
ers, 112 overruled the court of appeals' determination of the "consistent
legislative intent" as announced in Ray. 1 13 At issue in this puzzling
opinion1 14 was an action commenced by unrelated third parties peti-
tioning for custody of and visitation with a minor child. 115 In conclud-
ing that the unrelated third party plaintiffs lacked standing to initiate
well settled that the courts should construe the statute so as to avoid the constitutional
question.").
110. See In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1977) ("'Words in a
statute are to be given their natural, ordinary meaning, unless the context requires a
different construction."') (quoting In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E.2d 1, 7
(1968)).
111. See Martin v. Sanatorium, 200 N.C. 221, 223, 156 S.E. 849,850 (1930) ("[T]he
rule is that if two statutes, or two sections or parts of the same statute, relating to the
same subject, shall not be reconciled by any fair and reasonable method of
construction, the last in point of time will control."). See also Highway Comm'n v.
Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22 (1967).
[W]e apply the well recognized rules of statutory construction that the intent
of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute, and that when there
are two acts of the legislature applicable to the same subject, their provisions
are to be reconciled if this can be done by fair and reasonable intendment,
but, to the extent that they are necessarily repugnant, the later shall prevail.
Id. at 538-39, 153 S.E.2d at 26 (citations omitted).
112. 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
113. In Peterson, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
We agree with the reasoning of the trial court in Ray that N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1
was not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring custody or
visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such strangers.
Such a right would conflict with the constitutionally protected paramount
right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children. For these
reasons, we expressly disavow language in Ray indicating that the statute
changed the paramount right of parents.
Id. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
114. See Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without A
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 2145, 2171 (1998) ("It is arguable, however, that Supreme Court cases
after 1972 do not compel the Petersen decision and that the decision is in conflict with
North Carolina case law prior to and after 1972.").
115. The facts surrounding the Petersen opinion are extremely complex, involving
issues of policies against "purchasing" babies, and freedom of religion. Before all
issues had been resolved by the various appeals, nearly six years elapsed. For a more
266
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol23/iss2/3
2001] RE-EVALUATING GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION 267
an action for custody and/or visitation and thereby overruling Ray, the
supreme court examined various United States Supreme Court' 1 6 and
North Carolina Supreme Court opinions1 17 which identify a "para-
mount right" of a parent to the care, custody, control and supervision
of their minor child. In light of this "paramount right", the court deter-
mined that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) was not intended to "confer
upon strangers the right to bring custody or visitation actions against
the parents of children unrelated to [those strangers]."' 18 Although
the Petersen opinion noted" 9 that the legislature carved out excep-
tions for "biological" and "adoptive" grandparents, 12 o the court did not
formally reject a biological grandparent's right, pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.1(a), to seek court ordered visitation. However, the court
did outline a "bright-line" test to be utilized in custody disputes
between parents and non-parents.' 2 ' The reasoning of the North Caro-
complete description of the facts involving this case, see In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329
N.C. 692, 407 S.E.2d 505 (1991).
116. See Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 400-01, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1994):
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential', 'basic civil rights of man', and '[r]ights far more precious ... than
property rights'. 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.'
The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment ....
Id. at 400-01, 445 S.E.2d at 903 (1994) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).
117. See Peterson, 337 N.C. at 401-02, 445 S.E.2d at 904 ("North Carolina's
recognition of the paramount right of parents to custody, care, and nurture of their
children antedates the constitutional protections set forth in Stanley.") (citing Jolly v.
Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965) and Browning v. Humphrey, 241 N.C.
285, 84 S.E.2d 917 (1955)).
118. Peterson, 337 N.C. at 405, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
119. The court included a lengthy excerpt from the trial court's order in Ray, see
supra note 98, which dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint. The substance of the excerpt was
the same as that of the Petersen opinion, namely, that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) was
not intended to grant legal standing to unrelated third parties.
120. Peterson, 337 N.C. at 405, 445 S.E.2d 906.
121. Id. at 403-404, 445 S.E.2d at 905. ("We hold that absent a finding that (i)
parents are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the
constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of
their children must prevail.") Although this "bright-line" test was developed in the
context of a custody dispute between natural parents and unrelated third parties, one
must assume that the court intended for this test to apply to all disputes involving
parents and non-parents. As noted by Justice Scalia in his dissent in United States v.
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lina Supreme Court plainly ignores the plain and unambiguous lan-
guage of the statute,1 22 and thus ignores a long-standing tenet of
statutory construction.
The issue of grandparents' standing to institute an independent
action for visitation, not directly addressed by the court in Petersen,123
was directly addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in McIn-
tyre v. McIntyre. 124 In particular, the court examined, in light of the
Petersen opinion, the effect of the 1989 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.1(a). 125 Although the end result of the two opinions was simi-
lar (dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint), the court arrived at this
result utilizing different approaches. Where the court in Petersen con-
cluded that the unrelated third parties could not maintain their action
primarily based upon constitutional concerns, the court in McIntyre
concluded, based upon apparently pure statutory construction, that
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) did not grant grandparents standing to
petition for court ordered visitation except in a few limited circum-
stances. The court concluded that the specific statutes 126 restricted the
applicability of the broad statute127 so as to create a consistent legisla-
tive intent.128 Although the McIntyre opinion is interesting in the way
in which it arrived at a result diametrically opposed to the one reached
in Ray, it is more interesting to note the language used to support this
conclusion. The opinion does not definitively determine the legislative
intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1 et seq. Instead, the opinion repeat-
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the role of appellate courts is to decide cases to
establish precedent, and not to resolve the single case then before the court.
122. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123. 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
124. 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995). At issue in McIntyre was the dismissal
by the trial court of an action, filed by the biological paternal grandparents, pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), seeking visitation with their minor grandchildren over
the objections of the biological parents. At the time the complaint was filed, the
parents were living together and there was no ongoing custody dispute between the
parents.
125. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
126. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A; and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j).
127. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) (2000).
128. McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634, 461 S.E.2d at 749. The court stated:
The legislature's creation of special statutes to provide for grandparents'
visitation rights suggests that it did not intend N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1(a) as a
broad grant to grandparents of the right to visitation when the natural
parents have legal custody of their children and are living with them as an
intact family.
Id. (emphasis added).
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edly utilizes words of uncertainty, such as "suggests", 9 "appears",130
"probably",' 3 ' "seems",' 3 2 and "strongly suggests" 133 when concluding
that the specific statutes limit the breadth of the broad statute. Despite
this language of uncertainty, the court held that "[t]he three special
statutes provide grandparents with the right to seek 'visitation' only in
certain clearly specified situations . . . .", and that "[t]hese situations
do not include that of initiating suit against parents whose family is
intact and where no custody proceeding is ongoing."'134 As with the
Petersen decision, the McIntyre opinion ignores the plain and unam-
biguous language of the statute. 135 In addition, the opinion ignores
the tenet of statutory construction which dictates that the most
recently enacted statute is controlling. 136 In this particular case, the
second sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) is the most recently
enacted legislation.
In the wake of McIntyre, one last question need be addressed:
What constitutes a McIntyre "intact family"? In Fisher v. Gaydon,'37
the court of appeals examined the issue of what constitutes a McIntyre
"intact family."'1 38 Relying upon the language and facts of McIntyre,13 9
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant was not living in an "intact
129. See supra note 131.
130. "Rather, it appears that the legislature intended to grant grandparents a right to
visitation only in those situations specified in these three statutes." McIntyre, 341
N.C. at 634, 461 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
131. "The amendment probably was added to provide that in certain contexts
,custody' and 'visitation' are synonymous .... Id. (emphasis added).
132. "A legislative intent contrary to that for which plaintiffs argue therefore seems
clear." Id. at 635, 461 S.E.2d at 750 (emphasis added).
133. "Reading N.C.G.S. § 50-13.1(a) in conjunction with N.C.G.S. §§ 50-13.2(bl),
50-13.50), and -13.2A strongly suggests that the legislature did not intend 'custody'
and 'visitation' to be interpreted as synonymous in the context of grandparents'
rights." Id. at 634-35, 461 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 635, 461 S.E.2d at 749-50.
135. See supra notes 113 and 125 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).
138. Fisher involved an action commenced by the maternal grandparents against
their daughter seeking visitation with their two minor grandchildren. Defendant
Gaydon was a single mother of two children born from relationships between her and
two different men. At the time the grandparents filed their action for visitation, the
defendant mother was the plaintiff in an action seeking child custody and child
support against the father of one of the children. Several months after the
grandparents filed their complaint, the defendant mother dismissed, without
prejudice, her action against the child's father. Id.
139. Specifically, the plaintiffs relied upon the fact that the defendants in McIntyre
were living together and that there was no ongoing custody dispute. It should be noted
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nuclear family", and that therefore the plaintiffs had standing to peti-
tion for visitation. 4 ' In addition, the plaintiffs claimed standing due
to the existence of an "ongoing" custody dispute between the defen-
dant mother and the father of one of the minor children. 14' The court
of appeals, in an unanimous opinion, held that a single parent living
with his or her child(ren) does constitute a McIntyre "intact family. 142
In an attempt to further justify this holding, the opinion focused upon
the specific facts of Fisher: "In this case the record reveals that Ms.
Gaydon was living with her two children at the time the complaint was
filed, had lived with them for at least two years prior to the filing of the
action and this qualifies as an 'intact family'. '143 Unfortunately, the
court of appeals failed to provide any guidance as to which of these
facts, if any, were controlling in determining what constitutes an
"intact family." Nor did the court of appeals provide any indication as
to what weight should be given to these various factors.
As to the claim of standing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.2(bl), the court of appeals held that since the issues of custody and
support were not actually "contested,"" the grandparents lacked
standing to petition for visitation. 145 The obvious impact of this hold-
ing is that it further restricts the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a)
by requiring a "contested" ongoing action for custody in order for a
grandparent to possess the requisite standing to petition for visitation.
The less obvious impact is what ramification, if any, this holding may
have upon the standing granted to grandparents by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.2(bl) 146 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j). 1 47 In future dis-
putes, will the Fisher opinion require that the action in which a trial
court has exercised its discretion and granted visitation to the minor
that the court in McIntyre, when describing the applicable test, utilized the word
"parent" in its plural form. McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 635, 461 S.E.2d at 749-50.
140. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. at 445, 477 S.E.2d at 253.
141. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) (2000).
142. The court stated: "We believe a proper construction of that opinion is that a
single parent living with his or her child is an 'intact family' within the meaning of
McIntyre." Fisher, 124 N.C. App. at 445, 477 S.E.2d at 251 (citing Lambert v. Riddick,
120 N.C.App. 480, 484 n.2, 462 S.E.2d 835, 837 n.2 (1995)).
143. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. at 445, 477 S.E.2d at 251.
144. "There is nothing in this record showing that the alleged biological father was
contesting Ms. Gaydon's claim of custody." Id. at 446, 477 S.E.2d at 251.
145. The court stated: "It is only when the custody of a child is 'in issue' or 'being
litigated' that the grandparents are entitled to relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.2(bl). We therefore reject this argument." Id.
146. See supra note 93.
147. See supra note 95.
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children's grandparents have actually been contested?148 In addition,
when a minor child's grandparents file a motion in the cause alleging
"changed circumstances" and a "substantial relationship," will they
also need to allege that the prior action was actually "contested?"'149
Although the Fisher opinion does not anticipate these possibilities, it
neither explicitly nor implicitly prohibits them.
The Fisher opinion, authored by Judge K. Edward Greene, refers to
his dissenting opinion in Lambert v. Riddick.150 Although the opinion
in Lambert does not directly revolve around grandparents' rights to
petition for visitation, it is instructive to examine this dissent because
it begins to lay the foundation for the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Price v. Howard.15 1 In his dissent, Judge Greene argued
that in situations like the one in Lambert, where a parent is attempting
to get custody of their child and the child is in the custody of a third
party,152 that the "best interest test" should be employed. In essence,
Judge Greene would have the court focus upon the conduct of the par-
ties, which need not rise to the level of unfitness, in order to determine
the appropriate test to be employed. 153 As such, natural parents' con-
duct can decrease the level of protection afforded to their paramount
right. 15
4
148. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(bl) (2000). See also supra notes 147-148 and
accompanying text.
149. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j) (2000). See also supra notes 147-148 and
accompanying text.
150. 120 N.C. App. 480, 462 S.E.2d 835 (1995). See supra note 145. In Lambert, the
father of a minor child, born out of wedlock, brought an action for visitation against
the defendant mother and a third party (Utley) who had physical possession of the
child. Due to the defendant mother not being in a position to raise the child, Ms.
Utley, a friend of the defendant mother, had possession of the minor child since the
child's birth. The plaintiff alleged that he had been denied visitation. The mother and
Ms. Utley, filing a joint answer, denied this allegation and asserted a counterclaim for
custody. The trial court, employing the "best interests" test from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.2 placed custody of the child with Ms. Utley and granted visitation to plaintiff and
defendant mother. Plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Id.
151. 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997). See infra notes 162-164 and
accompanying text. Judge Greene's dissent in Price v. Howard, 122 N.C.App. 674, 471
S.E.2d 673 (1996), similar in logic to his dissent in Lambert, helps form the basis of
the supreme court's opinion in Price v. Howard, which overruled the court of appeals
decision.
152. The dissent did note, however, that the term custody, in this sense, meant
actual physical possession. See Lambert, 120 N.C.App. at 484, 462 S.E.2d at 837
(Greene, J., dissenting).
153. Cf. infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 484-85, 462 S.E.2d at 837-38. Justice Greene, in the Lambert dissent,
stated:
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The court of appeals decision in Price v. Howard,15 5 which
affirmed the order of the trial court, is nothing more than an applica-
tion of the prior decisions of the supreme court. The basic issue in
Price was a custody battle between a parent (defendant mother) and an
unrelated third party (putative father, plaintiff). 156 Applying the logic
and holding of Petersen, 15 7 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to place custody of the child with the biological
mother. In his dissent in Price, as in his dissent in Lambert, Judge
Greene broadened the scope of examined parental conduct beyond
acts of "unfitness", 158 and would have reversed the order of the trial
There is no evidence that the father was living together with the child in an
intact family unit at the time of this custody trial or that the child had been
removed from him unlawfully. Indeed the father had consented to the
placement of the child with Utley and the child had lived in that home for
approximately two years at the time the complaint for custody was filed.
Thus the custody dispute between the father and Utley was properly resolved
by the trial court using the best interest test of section 50-13.2(a).
Id. at 484-85, 462 S.E.2d at 837-38 (Greene, J., dissenting).
155. 122 N.C. App. 674, 471 S.E.2d 673 (1996). In Price, the plaintiff filed an
action seeking custody of a child, allegedly born of a relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant mother. Prior to the filing of the action, the defendant mother had
allowed the plaintiff to be an "equal caretaker," and, for an extended period of time,
the primary caretaker of the minor child. In response to the plaintiffs complaint, the
defendant mother denied that the plaintiff was the father of the minor child. A
paternity test was ordered, and the plaintiff was excluded as the minor child's father.
The trial court found that the "best interests" of the minor child would be served by
being in the custody of the plaintiff; however, since there were no allegations of
"unfitness," the court determined that it was compelled to award custody of the minor
child to the defendant mother. Id.
156. See Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without a
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 2145 (1998). Fowler and Nelson assert the following:
Thus, it is arguable that the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Price's claim for custody because he lacked standing to raise the
issue. But none of the courts that heard the matter dismissed Price's action.
The question remains whether Price overruled Petersen on the standing issue
or whether Price was subject to dismissal upon remand to the trial court.
Id. at 2195.
157. 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
158. Price v. Howard, 122 N.C. App. 674, 678, 471 S.E.2d 673, 675-76. Justice
Greene argued:
In this case, although the plaintiff has no biological relationship with the
child, 'biological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the
existence of a family.' . . Therefore, this plaintiff, although not the biological
parent of the minor child, must not be treated like a third party non-parent
within the meaning of Petersen. Within the meaning of Petersen, the plaintiff
is more like a parent and thus the best interest test should be applied.
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court. Since the defendant mother and the child were not living as an
intact family, and since the plaintiff putative father had possession of
the minor child, not as a result of any wrongful act of the plaintiff,
Judge Greene would have limited the Petersen holding, and would have
only required the application of the "best interests test."
As with the opinion in Petersen, the supreme court's opinion in
Price focused heavily upon issues of substantive due process and a
parent's paramount right/interest in the care, custody, control and
supervision of their minor children.15 9 After alleged 160 consideration
of various United States Supreme Court precedents, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court adopted a new "bright-line" test for custody dis-
putes between parents and non-parents:
If a natural parent's conduct has not been inconsistent with his or her
constitutionally protected status, application of the 'best interest of the
child' standard in a custody dispute with a non-parent would offend
the Due Process Clause .... However, conduct inconsistent with the
parent's protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level war-
ranting termination of parental rights, would result in application of
the 'best interests of the child' test without offending the Due Process
Clause.'61
This new "bright-line" test enables the trial court to consider a
much broader range of conduct that may justify overriding a parent's
"protected status." In the end, the supreme court's decision in Price
lowered the requisite burden for a non-parent seeking custody against
a natural parent. As with the Petersen opinion, the supreme court in
Id. (Greene, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843
(1977) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Cf. supra note 157 and
accompanying text.
159. In the Petersen opinion, the supreme court referred to the interest of a parent to
the care, custody and control of their minor children as a "paramount right." In the
Price decision, the supreme court refers to this interest as a "paramount interest." Due
to the change in the test required to overcome this "right"/"interest," it can be argued
that with the lessening of the necessary burden of proof, the court has recognized a
lesser protected interest. Although this change in semantics may, upon first glance,
appear to be nothing more than a simple change in semantics, examining the opinion
further reveals additional changes. Quoting Stanley v. Illinois, the court noted that the
right of a parent is an "important interest" which undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Price, 346 N.C. 68, 74, 484
S.E.2d 528, 531 (1997) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651). See also Troxel,
969 P.2d at 28. (In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court did not employ strict
scrutiny review, despite recognizing a parents fundamental right.).
160. See supra note 117.
161. Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534 (citations omitted).
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Price modified the manner in which it interpreted North Carolina's
custody statutes so that the desired equitable result could be reached.
Although the foregoing discussion of the supreme court's rulings
in Petersen162 and Price,'6 3 as well as the court of appeals' rulings in
Lambert16 4 and Price,165 would appear to have little impact upon the
rights of grandparents in seeking court ordered visitation, the facts
and the outcome of the supreme court's decision in Price effectively
overruled the logic of Petersen, which formed the basis of the supreme
court's ruling in McIntyre. 166 In its most basic terms, the dispute in
Price involved a natural parent and an unrelated, non-parent third
party. The plaintiff in Price was an "other person" under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.1(a). In Petersen, the supreme court held that N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.1(a) did not "confer upon strangers the right to bring
custody actions against parents of children unrelated to such stran-
gers." 167 Despite this, the court in Price allowed a person "unrelated"
to the minor child to gain custody of said minor child. Due to this
logical inconsistency, Price, which clearly overrules and/or modifies
Petersen by changing the applicable standard, apparently overrules the
logic and holding of McIntyre and its progeny. 168 Despite this appear-
ance, McIntyre remains good law.
As a result of the various previously discussed appellate decisions,
"any other person" does not really mean any other person, except
when the appellate courts deem it appropriate. The notion of custody
does not include visitation in the context of grandparental standing,
despite the clear language of the second sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.1(a). An "ongoing custody action" requires more than a com-
plaint having been filed and served. An unrelated third party can get
custody of a minor child, but a related grandparent generally lacks
standing altogether to petition for visitation. Although North Carolina
appellate courts have attempted to adopt "bright-line" tests to deter-
mine when an individual possesses standing to seek custody or visita-
tion, the reality is that the appellate courts have reviewed this issue on
a case-by case basis. The logical inconsistencies of prior decisions and
the strained interpretation of the various visitation statutes reveal the
162. See supra note 115.
163. See supra note 154.
164. See supra note 153.
165. See supra note 158.
166. See supra note 127.
167. 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
168. McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 629, 461 S.E.2d at 745.
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unworkable nature of the scheme currently employed by the North
Carolina appellate courts.
IV. A NEW BEGINNING
This article has gone to great lengths to reveal the illogical and
contradictory status of grandparental visitation under North Caro-
lina's present statutory scheme as interpreted by the North Carolina
Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court. Although
the North Carolina General Assembly could adopt additional statutes
or modify existing statutes to clarify their intent, the direct involve-
ment of the legislature is not necessary to correct these blatant defi-
ciencies. It is possible for North Carolina's current statutory scheme
to be judicially interpreted in such a manner so as to create a "consis-
tent legislative intent," and adequately protect a natural parent's pro-
tected status.
Traditionally, the term "custody" encompasses notions of both
physical custody and visitation.169 Despite this traditional interpreta-
tion, the General Assembly inserted a second sentence into N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.1(a) which explicitly made the words "custody" and "visi-
tation" synonymous, unless a contrary intent is clear. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.1(a) does not contain any language which would "clearly"
indicate that the legislature did not intend for the word "custody" to
include notions of both custody and visitation. 170 Therefore, by the
plain language of the statute itself, the first sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.1(a) is to be read as:
Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institu-
tion claiming the right to custody of or visitation with a minor child
may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of or visitation
with such child, as hereinafter provided. 7'
169. See generally Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129, 142 (1978):
G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (Replacement 1976) provides that '[a]n order of a court of
this State for custody ... of a minor child may be modified at any time, upon
motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party
or anyone interested.' Visitation privileges are but a lesser degree of custody.
Thus, we hold that the word 'custody' as used in G.S. 50-13.7 was intended to
encompass visitation rights as well as general custody.
Id. at 575-76, 243 S.E.2d at 142 (1978) (alteration in original).
170. To the contrary, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) is the first statute within Chapter
50 of the General Statutes which addresses the issue of child custody and child
support and serves as a quasi-definitional provision for the remaining statutes within
that subsection.
171. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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Giving the words of the statute their ordinary meaning, this is the
one logical contextual reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a). Any
other interpretation, such as that grandparents lack standing to insti-
tute an action for visitation, would negate the plain language of the
second sentence. 172
With this wording of the broad statute identified, the next step is
to determine whether this interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.1(a) can be read in pari materia173 with the more specific stat-
utes. 1 74 In post-Ray decisions, the appellate courts have determined
that the specific statutes must be read so as to limit the applicability of
the general statute. 175 This conclusion was reached after considera-
tion of the constitutional implications of a broad interpretation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a). 1 76
In order to read these various legislative enactments in a fashion
so as to reveal a consistent legislative intent, the specific statutes must
be read so as to expand upon, and not restrict, the rights granted by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a). 177 If there is an on-going custody action
between the minor child's natural parents, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.2(bl) empowers the trial court, exercising its broad discretion, to
grant visitation with the minor child to "any grandparent of the child."
Should a "grandparent"1 78 choose not to initiate a separate court pro-
ceeding, a grandparent is granted the authority to file a Motion in the
172. See generally In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
173. See supra note 26.
174. See supra notes 93-95.
175. See generally McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995);
Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
176. For the present analysis, constitutional concerns will be ignored until after the
completion of the interpretation of the statutes and determination of the legislative
intent.
177. The analysis of the court of appeals in Ray v. Ray, which did not include a
constitutional review of the identified statutory interpretation, was correct in its
analysis when it concluded that the other specific statutes were "merely supplemental"
to and not contradictory to the general statute. See generally Ray v. Ray 103 N.C. App.
at 790, 407 S.E.2d. at 593. See also Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating
Custody Waters Without a Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v.
Rogers and Price v. Howard, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 2145, 2177 (1998) ("[I]t is reasonable to
conclude, as the North Carolina Court of Appeals did in Ray, that the '[o]ther statutes
which allow actions for visitation (i.e., N.C.G.S. §§ 50-13.2A, 50-13.2(bl) and 50-
13.5(j)) are merely supplemental . . .[and] do not in any way contradict N.C.G.S.
§ 50-13.1(a).' Both § 50-13.2(bl) and § 50-13.2A concern only visitation for
grandparents in certain limited situations.") (quoting Ray, 103 N.C. App. at 793, 407
S.E.2d at 593).
178. As that term is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-15.5() (2000).
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Cause in a prior custody proceeding. 179 If there is an attempt by a
non-natural parent to adopt the minor child, and if the grandparent
can demonstrate a "substantial relationship" with the minor child,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A grants standing to the grandparent to com-
mence an action for visitation.
If none of the above specific situations, such as one where a prior
custody action has terminated due to the death of one of the parties,'
or one where a custody action involving the minor child is not "con-
tested", N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) grants standing to a grandparent
to initiate a separate action for visitation. Although the grant of stand-
ing to commence an action for visitation contained within N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-13.1(a) may appear superfluous in light of the standing
granted by the various specific statutes, the broad statute is necessary
in order for a grandparent to enjoy the rights granted by the specific
statutes. In order for a grandparent to petition for visitation pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j), the
grandparent must demonstrate, among other things, that the grandpar-
ent has a "substantial relationship" with the minor child."8" If the
grandparent has been denied contact with the minor child, it would be
impossible for the grandparent to demonstrate a "substantial relation-
ship." It is also illogical to reconcile the fact that a grandparent can be
denied standing to petition for visitation after the death of one of the
natural parents, but then be granted standing if and when the surviv-
ing natural parents re-marries, and the new spouse attempts to adopt
the minor child.
The apparent intent of these specific statutes is to preserve the
familial link between a minor child and his/her extended family.'8 2
179. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-15.5(j) (2000).
180. The trial court will only retain jurisdiction over issues of child custody until
the earlier of the minor child's emancipation, or the death of one or both of the child's
natural parents. See generally Morris v. Morris, 42 N.C. App. 222, 256 S.E.2d 302
(1979) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972)).
181. See supra notes 93 and 94.
182. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and
pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.... Ours
is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children
has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition.... Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a
decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated
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Although the other specific statutes provide avenues to grandparents
seeking visitation with their minor grandchildren,1 3 these statutes do
not provide relief to grandparents who have previously enjoyed visita-
tion1s4 and then have been completely denied contact. The grant of
standing by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) is a "close gap" measure
which applies in a possible situations not envisioned by the specific
statutes. 1
8 5
The above outlined interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a)
and the way in which it demonstrates a consistent legislative intent is
further supported by the fact that the broad statute was amended after
the passage of the various specific statutes.'8 6 The trial court and the
supreme court in Petersen reasoned that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a)
was not a broad grant, because if the legislature had so intended it
would have repealed several of the specific statutes.'8 7 The problem
with this logic is that it presupposes that the broad statute and the
specific statutes are inconsistent and contradictory. The fact that the
supreme court began from this premise is a further indication that the
opinion published by that court was driven by result rather than by
law.' The appropriate beginning inquiry should have addressed why
the legislature did not repeal the various specific statutes when they
(the legislature) amended the broad statute. If the analysis begins with
the assumption that the legislature intended what it did when it
amended the broad statute and did not repeal the various specific stat-
wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout
our history, that supports a larger concept of the family.
Id. at 503-505 (1977).
183. See supra notes 93-95.
184. Therefore, there was no need for the grandparent to seek court-ordered
visitation.
185. In Ennis v. Fish (COA99-1382) (unpublished), see supra note 2, the Order of
the trial Judge, the Honorable Robert M. Brady, found that "the danger of enacting
statutes of such a specific nature is that they may not have considered all possible
scenarios that may arise, and, perhaps, this exact issue was not contemplated by the
legislature when it enacted the legislation."
186. See supra 106, and accompanying text.
187. See supra text accompanying note 98.
188. See Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without a
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 2145, 2171 (1998):
It is arguable, however, that Supreme Court cases after 1972 do not compel
the Petersen decision and that the decision is in conflict with North Carolina
case law prior to and after 1972. The Petersen court's failure to explore
Supreme Court cases other than Stanley and Reno and the North Carolina
polar star cases . . . is perplexing.
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utes, the courts should have. attempted to discern how the statutes are
consistent.
As discussed above,18 9 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), as it should
be interpreted according to the tenets of statutory construction, is as
broad as the Washington statute that was found to be unconstitutional
in Troxel. As such, the North Carolina appellate courts must judicially
modify the statute in order to apply the statute in accordance with con-
stitutional mandates, if possible, and so as to further the consistent
legislative intent.1 90 In an effort to do so, the North Carolina appellate
courts have interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) so as to deny
grandparents standing to petition for visitation absent an ongoing
"contested" custody action or when the -minor child's parents are living
together as an "intact family. '"19 ' Since a single parent household can
qualify as an "intact family", and since specific statutes address when
a grandparent may obtain relief in an ongoing custody action, the
actual result of this interpretation is to render the second sentence of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), in the context of grandparental visitation,
a legal nullity. 192 Although the North Carolina appellate courts have
limited the number of persons who may petition, they have not pro-
vided guidance as to what factors to consider once a petition has been
properly filed. In light of the Troxel plurality, 193 concurring, and dis-
senting opinions, the interpretive scheme employed by the North Caro-
189. See supra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.
190. This is something that the Supreme Court of Washington was unwilling to do.
191. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 635, 461 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1995).
Although the McIntyre opinion does not address a situation where grandparents
demonstrate "conduct inconsistent with the parent's paramount protected status," it
seems only logical that in such a situation a grandparent could petition for visitation.
If the grandparent could petition for custody based upon that standard, they should be
able to petition for visitation, which is a lesser form of custody. See supra note 173.
192. Since grandparents already possessed standing, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.2(bl), to obtain court ordered visitation, this interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-13.1(a) is redundant. In addition, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Fisher
v. Gaydon held that since custody was not being contested by the child's father, and
that since the defendant mother dismissed her an action for custody, the petitioning
grandparents lacked the required standing. 124 N.C. App. 442, 445-46, 477 S.E.2d
251, 253 (1996). Since a single parent can qualify as an "intact family", what situation
will not qualify as an "intact family"? See id. at 445-46, 477 S.E.2d at 252-53.
193. As previously noted, the plurality opinion in Troxel cited to several state
statutes which allowed grandparents standing to petition for visitation when denied
contact with their minor grandchildren. By their own terms, these statutes limit their
applicability, and provide guidance as to what factors the court must consider.
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lina appellate courts is insufficient to protect a parent's "protected
status" once a petition has been filed.194
Assume for a moment that a grandparent has filed a petition for
visitation, and pursuant to McIntyre and Fisher possesses the requisite
standing. In determining whether to grant visitation, the trial court
must simply determine, utilizing its discretion, whether the requested
visitation is in the "best interests" of the minor child.' 95 Although in
this situation the grandparents were forced to jump through several
procedural hoops, this procedure, like the one created by the Washing-
ton statute challenged in Troxel, fails to adequately safeguard the "pro-
tected interests" of the natural parents. 196 The trial court may, but is
not required to, consider the decision of the natural parents. 197 If the
trial court does consider the decision of the natural parents, what
weight should be given to that decision?' 98 Absent additional protec-
tions, the mere application of the "best interests test" when determin-
ing issues of grandparental visitation is unconstitutional.' 99
Although the Troxel plurality opinion ultimately held that the
Washington grandparental visitation statute was unconstitutional as
applied, it provides an outline of factors that should be considered so
as to adequately safeguard natural parents' "protected status. 20 0
Using these factors as a guide, North Carolina appellate courts can give
full effect to the "consistent legislative intent" created by the broad stat-
ute2° ' and the various specfic statutes,20 2 and in so dong safeguard the
"protected status" of natural parents.20 3 First, the trial courts should
be required to consider allegations of "conduct inconsistent" with the
194. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
195. See In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 105, 302 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1980) ("To
support an award of visitation rights, the trial court judgment 'should contain findings
of fact which sustain the conclusions of law that a party is a fit person to visit the child
and that such visitation rights are in the best interest of the child."') (quoting
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 157, 231 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1977). See
also Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14 (1988).
196. The only protection afforded by the current scheme is the minimal protection
of reducing the number of persons eligible to "drag" natural parents into court.
197. Cf. supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
198. Cf. supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
203. Although the appellate courts will be performing a "quasi"-legislative function
by requiring any safeguards, by doing so, the appellate courts would be adhering to
the various tenets of statutory interpretation previously outlined (see supra notes
111-114), and would be giving full effect to the intent of the legislature.
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parent's "protected status." Although the Troxel opinion refers to alle-
gations of unfitness, it may be more informative to allow the trial court
to consider a broader spectrum of possible conduct. 2°4 Also, if under
current North Carolina law "conduct inconsistent" with a parent's pro-
tected status can form a basis to award custody to a third party, this
same standard should also form a basis to award visitation to a related
grandparent, despite objections of a natural parent. Next, there should
be a rebuttable presumption that a natural parent's decision not to
allow visitation is in the best interests of the minor child. In addition,
in the context of grandparental visitation, the court should consider
whether the grandparents have been denied complete contact. Finally,
there should be a "catch-all" requirement that the court consider "any
other factor" relevant to its inquiry. This-will allow the trial court to
consider the entire factual situation surrounding the dispute. Based
upon the evidence of these factors, or the lack thereof, the court should
exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to grant visitation.
Admittedly, these factors are extremely vague and will require case-by-
case examination. Determining issues of child custody and visitation
is far from an exact science.
The Troxel plurality opinion provided a possible alternative to
wholesale creation of new standards. The opinion cited several state
statues that grant visitation to grandparents when they have been
denied complete contact with their minor grandchildren.25 The
appellate courts could simply adopt the requirements of the Missis-
sippi, Oregon, or Rhode Island statutes. These requirements are quite
similar to those outlined above. The least demanding of the three stat-
utes is the Mississippi statute, which only requires proof of a prior
"viable" relationship, unreasonable denial of visitation, and that the
requested visitation would serve the best interests of the minor
child.20 6 The most demanding statute is the Rhode Island statute,
which would require repeated attempts to visit with the minor chil-
dren, proof of no other option other than judicial intervention, and
clear and convincing evidence proving that the decision of the natural
parent was unreasonable.20 7
V. CONCLUSION
When courts examine issues of child custody and visitation, the
inquiry should be guided by the "polar star": the child's best inter-
204. See generally Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).
205. See supra notes 66 - 68 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 66. Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A (2000).
207. See supra note 68.
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ests.2 °8 Towards this end, the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted statutes that grant grandparents standing to petition for visita-
tion with their minor grandchildren. During the previous several
years, the North Carolina appellate courts, in an effort to protect the
rights of natural parents, have eviscerated the application of these stat-
utes. In light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Troxel v.
Granville, the North Carolina appellate courts can give effect to these
grandparental visitation statutes and continue to protect the rights of
natural parents. The current illogical interpretation of these statutes is
no longer required and should be re-examined and reversed, thereby
once again allowing grandparents to possess the legal standing to peti-
tion for court ordered visitation.
208. See Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without a
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 2145 (1998) ("For over 100 years, the best interest of the child was the
'polar star' that guided North Carolina courts in third-party custody proceedings.").
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